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Abstract
Without denying particular dimensions of the decentralisation in Sub-Saharan countries, this paper
applies standard reasoning from the scal federalism literature to a developing country and tests
the existence of strategic interactions among local Beninese governments, called communes. We
rst propose a two-jurisdiction model of public expenditure interactions, considering a constrained
Nash equilibrium to capture the extreme poverty of some communes. We show that spillovers among
jurisdictions involve strategic behaviours of local o¢ cials who have su¢ cient levels of scal resources.
Second, by estimating a spatial lag model, our analysis provides evidence for the presence of strategic
interactions in Benin, contingent on communes scal autonomy. Such interactions arise among
communes which are geographically or ethnically close. We also highlight both an opportunistic
behaviour of local governments before local elections and an e¤ect of partisan a¢ liations. This African
democracy appears to be as concerned as developed democracies with strategic scal interactions.
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1 Introduction
Decentralisation has recently been embraced by a large number of developing countries,
especially in Africa, since it has been presented as a powerful tool to reduce poverty and
improve governance. The World Bank in particular views it as one of the major reforms on
its agenda. In response to the failure of a central state to run the countriesdevelopment
or to limit the risk of civil conicts in ethnically fragmented countries, decentralisation is
perceived as a way to ensure political stability, to improve accountability and responsiveness
of local leaders, to increase the e¢ ciency of public policy, and ultimately to reduce poverty.
Two principal and non-exclusive arguments might explain this infatuation with decen-
tralisation in developing countries. The rst one is what we call the proximity principle,
given that decentralisation moves governments closer to citizens. Oates (1972) decentralisa-
tion theorem states that decentralisation improves preference matching by o¤ering a greater
diversity of public services to a heterogeneous population. Moreover, by reducing infor-
mational asymmetries between those in power and those governed, decentralisation should
induce a higher accountability of governments and in ne a better e¢ ciency in public spend-
ing. The second main argument in favour of decentralisation dates at least from Tiebout
(1961) and may be called the competition principle. Indeed, decentralisation is supposed to
induce some interjurisdictional competition among political powers: voting with feetand
yardstickcompetition (Salmon, 1987) are another ways to increase the e¢ ciency of public
spending.
Bardhan (2002) argued, however, that the institutional context (and therefore the struc-
ture of incentives and organisation) in developing and transition economies is quite di¤erent
from those in advanced industrial economies, and he recommended us to go beyond the
traditional scal federalism literature. The reason is that most developing countries do
not meet implicit or explicit assumptions posed by scal federalism theory. For instance,
the Tiebout model cannot be applied to developing countries where the population mobility
appears to be strongly limited. The existence of a yardstick competition appears at least
debatable in the context of young democracies. Moreover, apart from the corruption issue
emphasised by Prudhomme (1995) or Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005), these countries face
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some administrative capacity constraints that the rich countries do not su¤er.
These pitfalls have induced the literature on decentralisation in developing countries to
focus on the e¤ectiveness of the rst argument, the proximity principle. For instance, Faguet
(2004) shows that decentralisation in Bolivia has improved the responsiveness of public in-
vestment to local needs. Alderman (2002) established that local o¢ cials in Albania manage
anti-poverty programmes more accurately and cost-e¤ectively than a central government
agency since they are better informed. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) and Galasso and
Ravallion (2005) have also highlighted that decentralisation improves anti-poverty systems
in particular through better intra-regional targeting. These analyses suggest that decentral-
isation may lead to poverty reduction from the bottom up.1 None of these authors, however,
consider the second aspect of decentralisation, the competition principle, which induces
some jurisdictionsinteractions.
Do we have to believe that no interaction exists among local governments in developing
countries and that decentralisation is only guided by the proximity principle argument?
The departure from the classic scal federalism literature advocated by Bardhan (2002)
might have been followed too far.2 The aim of this paper is to come back to the competition
principleby examining interactions among local governments in a developing country. With-
out ignoring some of the specicities of developing countries, such as the extreme poverty of
some jurisdictions, for instance, we apply some standard reasoning of the scal federalism
literature to a developing country, Benin, which has recently experienced a decentralisation
process.
Considering the degree of freedom of local governments in developing countries, we focus
on the public expenditure side and not on the revenues side to shed light on jurisdictional
interactions. With respect to the huge literature on tax competition the analysis of public
spending interaction seems very limited: for instance, Kelejian and Prucha (1998), Redoano
(2007) and Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008) respectively study the US, the EU and France.
For developing countries this kind of work is even rarer: Akin, Hutchinson, and Strumpf
1 The relationship between decentralisation and poverty alleviation has been reviewed by Klugman (1997)
and Bird and Rodriguez (1999).
2 Chavis (2009) studies the e¤ect of competition on decentralisation e¢ ciency in Indonesia. The author
considers the extent to which the cost per square metre of road project decreases in the number of villages
which compete to obtain grants from the central government. The appreciation of competition is limited to
the number of competitors. There is no analysis of interactions.
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(2005) analyse decentralised health care in Uganda; Arze, Martinez-Vasquez, and Puwanti
(2008) investigate local public spending in Indonesia.
The aim of this paper is rst to establish the existence (or not) of interactions among local
Beninese governments, and second to identify its nature. This last notion directly refers to
the industrial organisation literature and the well-established notion of strategic complemen-
tarity or strategic substitutability provided by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985).
We intend to tackle the following issues: (1) does decentralisation induce interjurisdictional
interactions in Benin? (2) if yes, what is the nature of this competition (strategic comple-
ments or substitutes): does an increase in the spending of a jurisdiction induce a similar or
inversed variation in neighbouring jurisdictions? (3) which factors (geographical, political or
ethnic) help to boost this competition? (4) nally, what happens during election periods?
Our empirical analysis through a spatial lag model conrms the existence of strategic in-
teractions among Beninese local governments. Moreover public spending choices are strategic
complements. These interactions, which are contingent on communesresources, exist not
only among neighbouring communes but also among those close in terms of ethnic com-
position. Lastly, our analysis highlights an e¤ect of partisan a¢ liations and opportunistic
behaviour of local governments, which increase public spending in pre-electoral periods.
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. Section 2 develops a theoretical
analysis of local public spending interactions which takes into account resource constraints of
some local governments. In Section 3, after a brief overview of Benin we test the existence of
interactions among Beninese local governments between 2002 and 2008; we also identify the
scal setting behaviour of local governments during election periods. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
In this section, we present a theoretical model in order to highlight behaviours at play in
determining the levels of public spending of local governments in a developing country. Our
approach is very standard regarding the literature on scal federalism, but we take into
account some earmarks of developing countries. In particular we develop a constrained Nash
equilibrium in order to capture the extreme poverty of some communes. Indeed, the poorest
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communes in Benin, Bassila, Cobly, Kandi or Kari-Mama, for instance, respectively display
an average level of annual resources of 168, 526, 734 and 861 FCFA per capita (respectively
equivalent to $0.31, $0.97, $1.35 and $1.58). Beyond their realism, our assumptions have to
be consistent with our empirical tools, in particular those of spatial econometrics, which we
use in the next section.
2.1 The model
We consider two jurisdictions (i and j) of the same level. We do not study political issues
and then adopt a normative approach. The utility function of a representative individual in
jurisdiction i is given by W i (xi; gi; ijgj), where xi is the private consumption, gi the public
spending in jurisdiction i, and ij is an exogenous non negative parameter, which represents
the degree of spillover e¤ect for inhabitants in jurisdiction i from the public good provided
in jurisdiction j. We may have situations where spillovers are not symmetric (ij 6= ji).3 We
dene  = (ij ; ji).
Since spatial empirics use weighting matrices for the strategic variables (gi;j), the unique
consistent aggregation technology of local public goods is the weighted summation. Thus, it
follows:
W i (xi; gi; ijgj) = V
i (xi; gi + ijgj) ;
where the weight is the parameter ij .
Our analysis focuses exclusively on current local public spending, since it is better con-
trolled by local governments than investment expenditures. Indeed these latter are often
ordered and nanced by central government. The current spending is a mix of public and
merit goods. We are not able to say whether local public spending is a complement to or
substitute for private consumption. Thus, without loss of generality concerning our analysis
of jurisdictions interactions, we will consider a quasi-linear utility function, that is, local
public spending and private consumption are Edgeworth-independent:
V i (xi; gi + ijgj) = xi + vi (gi + ijgj) ;
3 This assumption is linked to our empirical work too. Since proximity matrices are normalised, their sum
is equal to unity for each i. Thus, we have ij = ji if and only if jurisdictions i and j have the same number
of neighbours for a proximity matrix based on contiguity.
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where the function vi (:) is the appreciation of local public goods in jurisdiction i. This
function is increasing in its argument v0i (:) > 0. The sign of its second derivative, however,
remains indeterminate. Indeed the concavity of function vi (:), which is often assumed in the
literature, would restrict our theoretical analysis of jurisdictional interactions to the case of
strategic substitutes.
We ignore the issue of local debt, which is the focus in important literature on soft budget
constraints. Very few countries in Africa, however, allow their local governments to run into
debt. Thus, private consumption is equal to net income, and the local government faces the
following hard budget constraint (BC):
Ri = xi + c (gi) ; (1)
where Ri is the income of jurisdiction i and c (:) is the cost of providing an amount gi of local
public good. This cost is assumed to be increasing and convex: dc(gi)dgi > 0 and
d2c(gi)
dg2i
> 0.
The convexity reects the increasing marginal cost of public funds. Since we focus on current
spending and not on public investments, we ignore scale economies. This assumption is not
rejected by a preliminary empirical test on our data.4 In order to have some interior solutions
when the jurisdiction is not constrained by its wealth, we have to assume that
8i; j; c00 (gi) > v00i (gi + ijgj) : (2)
The convexity of public spending must be superior to the variation of the marginal utility of
public goods. This condition obviously holds as soon as the function vi (:) is concave.
Substituting the expression of the private consumption given by (1) into the initial welfare
function, we obtain the following objective function, denoted by U i, which only depends on
the strategic variables (gi; gj):
U i (gi; ijgj) = Ri   c (gi) + vi (gi + ijgj) :
4 We show the absence of scale economies in providing current public spending according to the size of the
jurisdiction (measured by the population density, dens). Both signs of rst and second derivatives are positive
and signicantly di¤erent from zero: gi= 3:751:densi + 0:001:dens2i . Detailed results are provided in
Table 1 in the appendix.
5
Each local government chooses its level of public spending, considering as given the levels
of public good in the other jurisdiction. The played game is static and the Nash equilibrium
may be constrained. Indeed, we take into account situations where a local government is too
poor to nance the minimum of public spending. This leads us to consider a constrained
Nash equilibrium denoted by gi (),
gi () = min fgi; egi ()g ;
where gi is given by
Ri   c (gi) = 0;
and egi () is the solution of the unconstrained Nash equilibrium:
8>><>>:
egi ()  argmax
gi>0
U i

gi; ijg

j

egj ()  argmax
gj>0
U j (gj ; ijg

i )
The set of strategies for each jurisdiction i is compact and it corresponds to [0; gi]. The First
Order Condition (FOC) of the preceding programme for player i is
 dc (gi)
dgi
+ v0i
 
gi + ijg

j ()

= 0: (3)
The Second Order Condition (SOC) is respected under condition (2).
We focus on the nature of competition among jurisdictions when it exists. These strate-
gic interactions are captured through the sign of dgidgj . Following Bulow, Geanakoplos, and
Klemperer (1985), we dene local public goods as strategic complements (resp. substitutes)
if and only if the marginal utility of public good in jurisdiction i is increasing in the level of
local public goods in the other jurisdictions, more formally if @
2U i(gi;ijgj)
@gi@gj
> 0 (resp. < 0).
If jurisdiction i is constrained by its wealth, that is, if c (egi ()) > Ri, we have gi = gi and
@gi
@gj
= 0; otherwise gi = egi () and the application of the envelope theorem to (3) yields:
@gi
@gj
=  
@2U i(gi;ijgj)
@gi@gj
@2U i(gi;ijgj)
@g2i
: (4)
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Since the denominator corresponds to the SOC of the maximisation programme, the sign of
@gi
@gj
is then equivalent to the sign of @
2U i(gi;ijgj)
@gi@gj
, which also corresponds to the sign of v00i (:).
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2.2 Comparative statics
We will now consider a unilateral change in the degree of the spillovers experienced in ju-
risdiction i from jurisdiction j. By so doing we can compare the e¤ects on the behaviour of
jurisdiction i between an increase of public spending of a neighbouring jurisdiction and the
same variation of a more distant jurisdiction. In other words, we estimate the consequences
of geographic or ethnic proximity on local governmentspublic spending.
For comparative staticsanalysis, we follow Caputo (1996). Indeed, unlike single-agent
models, knowledge of how a parameter a¤ects the marginal value of the i th players decision
variables in a static game is not su¢ cient to determine the Nash equilibrium comparative
statics for the level of the i th players decision variables. We also have to determine how the
parameters change a¤ects the other players best reply, and nally how these last variations
impact on the marginal value of the i th players decision variable.
Considering the unconstrained Nash equilibrium (8i; gi () = egi ()) the di¤erentiation
of (3) with respect to ij for both jurisdictions yields:
0B@ U i11 (:) ijv00i (:)
jiv
00
j (:) U
j
11 (:)
1CA
0B@ @egi()@ij
@egj()
@ij
1CA=
0B@  ijegj () v00i (:)
0
1CA :
Applying the Cramer rule we then obtain:
@egi()
@ij
=   ijegj()jJ j v00i (egi () + ijegj ())U j11 (egj () ; jiegi ()) ;
@egj()
@ij
=
ijjiegj()
jJ j v
00
i (egi () + ijegj ()) v00j (egj () + jiegi ()) : (5)
where J is the Jacoby matrix and its determinant is given by
jJ j =

U i11 (egi () ; ijegj ()) ijv00i (egi () + ijegj ())
jiv
00
j (egj () + jiegi ()) U j11 (egj () ; jiegi ())
 : (6)
5 If this last expression is positive, then the game played by each jurisdiction is supermodular as noted by
Topkis (1998) and at least one equilibrium exists.
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Generally, the sign of jJ j remains indeterminate, since it does not rely on the sign of the
Hessian matrix of a single optimisation problem as Caputo (1996) emphasises it. Thus,
without additional assumptions about the stability or uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium,
for instance, we cannot sign jJ j. We then obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 Under our assumptions, we have
(i) If the jurisdiction i is constrained by its wealth
 egi () > c 1 (Ri), a change in ij has
no e¤ect on the level of provided public good in both jurisdictions;
(ii) If the jurisdiction j is constrained by its wealth, a change in ij has no e¤ect on the level
of provided public good in jurisdiction j but increases (decreases) the level of public good in
jurisdiction i if public goods are strategic complements (substitutes);
(iii) If no jurisdiction is constrained, an increase in the degree of spillover from jurisdiction j
to i (ij) involves a variation in the same (opposite) sense in both jurisdictions if local public
goods are strategic complements (substitutes).
Proof. (i) If gi () = gi; it is then obvious that
@gi ()
@ij
= 0 and
@gj ()
@ij
= 0 from di¤erentiation
of (3) with respect to ij .
(ii) If gj () = gj and g

i () = egi (), then we have @gj ()@ij = 0 which yields
@gi ()
@ij
=  ijgjv
00
i
 
gi + ijgj

@2U i(gi;ijgj)
@g2i
:
(iii) If gi () = egi () and gj () = egj (), we obtain from (5)
@egi ()
@ij
@egj ()
@ij
=  ji

ijegj () v00i (egi () + ijegj ())
jJ j
2
v00j (egj () + jiegi ())U j11 (egj () ; jiegi ()) :
The parameter ij may represent, for instance, the degree of proximitythat jurisdiction i
experiences from the local public good provided by jurisdiction j. This proximitywill be
expressed in geographic or ethnic terms in our empirical works. An increase in ij would
induce two e¤ects on gi: one direct and one indirect (strategic) e¤ect through the level of
public good provided by the neighbour (gj). If jurisdiction i is constrained by its wealth, any
change in ij does not a¤ect the equilibrium value. Indeed, neither the direct e¤ect, nor the
strategic e¤ect would come into play, since the level of public spending in this jurisdiction
is at the corner. If it is the other jurisdiction, namely j, which is constrained, then only
the direct e¤ect of ij would play on gi. An increase of ij induces an increase (decrease) in
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gi local public expenditures are strategic complements (substitutes). Remember that in the
presence of strategic complements, the marginal utility of local public good increases in the
level of the other local public good or in the spillover e¤ect.
Finally, if no jurisdiction is constrained, then both e¤ects are at play. Without additional
assumptions, however, particularly on the sign of jJ j, we can only conclude that an increase in
ij would induce an increase or a decrease of levels of local public goods in both jurisdictions
in the presence of strategic complements. Otherwise, that is in the presence of strategic
substitutes, an exogenous change of ij would involve opposite variations among jurisdictions.
Following Dixit (1986) or Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987), we specify the uniqueness and
the stability of the Nash equilibrium through the following assumption:6
jJ j > 0: (7)
This relationship allows us to pinpoint the sense of variations resulting from the two kinds
of parameter changes. We obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 Under our assumptions and (7), an increase in the degree of spillover from
jurisdiction j to i (ij) involves an increase (decrease) of the level of public goods in both
jurisdictions if local public goods are strategic complements (substitutes).
Proof. Immediate from (5).
Assuming the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium allows us to specify the sense of de-
viation of public spending when the degree of spillovers varies. To sum up our theoretical
results, we showed that spillovers among jurisdictions involve strategic behaviours, which in
turn lead to a competition process. Without restricting the nature of such a competition,
we estimated to what extent the level of provided public good is a¤ected by a deviation in
the degree of spillovers.
Our theoretical framework yields the following implications: (1) the provision of local
public goods with spillovers may induce two cases: (a) strategic interactions in terms of
6 If we adopt the contraction approach (see Vives, 1999), the condition of equilibrium uniqueness involves
U i11 (gi; ijgj) +
vi12 (gi; ijgj) < 0;
which yields that jJ j is positive.
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complements or substitutes (classical result), (b) no strategic interactions owing to the in-
su¢ cient level of scal resources and despite positive externalities (largely ignored by the
relevant literature); (2) under the presence of strategic complements, the expected quantity
of public goods in jurisdiction i will positively depend on the level of public good allocated
by jurisdiction j; (3) in the presence of strategic substitutes, an opposite relationship is ex-
pected; (4) the sign of such a strategic interaction is not determined a priori, since di¤erent
measures of contiguity may be put forward (geographical or ethnic contiguity).
3 Empirical evidence of public spending interactions in a less
developed country: the case of Benin
Our empirical analysis focuses on Benin, a young democracy, which is quite representative
of the Sub-Saharan region. After a brief overview of this country, we test the existence
of strategic interactions among local governments spending with the spatial econometric
method. We then examine if a change in these interactions occurs during election years.
3.1 Benin overview
With a per capita income of US$ 570 in 2007 and a ranking of 163 out of 177 countries,7
Benin remains one of the poorest countries of the world. It is ethnically fragmented.8 Since
its independence on 1 August, 1960, the history of Benin has been chaotic. A succession
of military governments ended in 1972 with the last military coup led by Mathieu Kerekou
and the establishment of a government based on Marxist-Leninist principles. A move to
democracy began in 1989. Two years later, free elections ushered in former Prime Minister
Nicephore Soglo (a former World Bank o¢ cial) as President. Kerekou regained power in
1996 in elections fraught with irregularities and won subsequent elections in 2001. Having
served two terms and being over 70, he was ineligible to run in the presidential elections
of 2006. He was succeeded by Thomas Boni Yayi, an independent political outsider who
had previously headed the West African Development Bank. In March 2007, President Yayi
7 Human Development Report (2007).
8 Among the 42 ethnic groups, the most prominent are the Fon and the Adjas in the south, the Baribas
and the Sombas in the north and the Yorubas in the south-east.
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Boni strengthened his position following the legislative elections in which his coalition, Force
Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent (FCBE)won the largest number of seats (35 out of 83) and
negotiated a pro-government majority in Parliament with seven minor parties and coalitions
joining the FCBE.
This democratic process was accompanied by a huge transformation of the political and
administrative organisation. Since 1998, Benin has undergone a decentralisation process that
became e¤ective with local elections in 2002. The second local elections took place in 2008.9
As depicted in Figure 1, Benin is divided into twelve départements which are subdivided
into 77 communes, which are further divided into 546 districts. Départements are managed
by a representative of the central government. In contrast, communes are ruled by a local
government directly elected by inhabitants. The average size of communes, presented in the
following map, numbers about 90,000 inhabitants.
Insert Figure 1
In January 1999, law 97-029 dened the transferred competencies from the centre to the 77
communes. Theoretically, competencies of Beninese communes range from elementary school
to economic development and include transport infrastructure, environment (hygiene), health
and social goods, tourism, security or market-place management. As in most of African
countries, however, this competencestransfer was not accompanied by an adequate transfer
of resources. Beninese communes are characterised by a very low level of resources (only
about 4.5% of country tax revenues or equivalently 0.7% of GDP).10 Moreover, important
inequalities appear between communes: the resources of the ten poorest communes represent
5 per cent of the resources of the ve richest ones.
9 The rst round of municipal elections held on 15 December, 2002 and the second round on 19 January,
2003 with an average rate of turnout estimated at 70 per cent.
10 Local resources are mainly communesown resources (about 70%). Property taxes and licences to exercise
a trade or profession (patente) represent 90% of local tax revenues (see Chambas, Brun, and Rota Graziosi,
2008 for a detailed analysis of local scal resources in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Benin). Retroceded
taxes, which come from transfers of state tax revenue to local governments, account for about 10% of local
resources.
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3.2 Econometric framework
Horizontal interactions entail a scal reaction function that depicts how the decision variable
for a given jurisdiction depends on the decisions of other jurisdictions. To test the existence
of such functions, we have to test spatial dependence in a panel data framework. We consider
a specication in the most general form in which commune i public expenditure in year t,
dened by Git, is a function of its neighbourssame public choice, Gjt. Moreover, we allow
Git to depend on a vector of specic controls Xit and we include a commune-specic e¤ect,
i.11 This gives the following specication:
Git =
X
ij
ij :Gjt + :Xit + i + "it; (8)
where i = 1; : : : ; n denotes a commune and t = 1; : : : ; T a time period, ;  and  are
unknown parameters and "it a random error. Since there are too many parameters ij to be
estimated, the usual procedure is to consider:
Git = :Ajt + :Xit + i + "it; (9)
where Ajt =
X
ij :Gjt. Git, the vector of public spending in a local government i at time t
depends on Ajt, the weighted average vector of public spending in the set of the other local
governments j at time t and a set of specic controls Xit.
We explore a variety of weighting schemes to allow di¤erent patterns of spatial interac-
tions. We are then able to examine the nature of the neighbouring e¤ects and to discuss
the denition of distance. First, we have chosen a common geographical denition of neigh-
bouring communities based on a contiguity matrix where the value one is assigned if two
jurisdictions share the same border and zero otherwise. This scheme is given by the weight
matrix neigh. Contiguity is commonly used in the relevant empirical literature. Second,
we dene an ethnic weight matrix ethn based on the ethnic proximity of communes in-
habitants. Ethnic proximity is dened as the probability that two individuals randomly
drawn from two distinct communes are from the same ethnic group. In doing so, we test
11 All time-invariant community characteristics, observed or unobserved can be represented by community-
specic intercepts.
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the existence of spending interactions between communes which are similar with respect to
ethnicity. The rst two weighting schemes are based on the idea that communes follows
communes close to them either geographically or with similar socio-economic structure.12
Then, we consider a possible weighting scheme in which weights are assumed to be identi-
cal for all communes j (uni). This uniform weighting scheme will give us a useful benchmark
to ascertain whether the potential observed spatial auto-correlation can be attributed to a
substantive strategic interaction process and not to a common intellectual trend.13 More-
over, following Lockwood and Migali (2009), we compare ethnic and contiguity weights with
placeboweights, plac, which are chosen in a random way. We generate a random number
distributed between zero and one for each commune. Then, the weight assigned between two
communes is the di¤erence between its random numbers. Evidence of strategic interactions
with this placebo matrix would indicate some general positive correlations between all public
spending owing to omitted common shocks.14
Finally, we present a dynamic version of the model. We introduce the lagged dependent
variable, Git 1 , as a right-hand side in order to take into account the persistency in public
expenditure (see Veiga and Veiga, 2007). The dynamic model can be written as follows:
Git = :Git 1 + :Ajt + :Xit + i + "it: (10)
By estimating this reaction function we are confronted with important econometric issues as
described by Brueckner (2003). First, because of strategic interactions, public expenditure in
di¤erent jurisdictions is jointly determined. Therefore, neighboursdecisions are endogenous
and correlated with the error term "it and ordinary least squares estimation of the parameters
is inconsistent, requiring alternative estimation methods based on the instrumental variables
12 In the welfare competition literature, jurisdictions are likely to take into account inhabitantsmobility
in the neighbouring communities induced by an increase in its own welfare. In the yardstick competition
literature, residents consider neighbouring jurisdictions on which they are likely to get better information
as a yardstick to compare the performance of their incumbent. It is easy to understand that ethnic as well as
geographic proximity could explain such interactions.
13 Indeed, our theory relies on the common assumption that local governments behave strategically with
each other. Alternatively, Manski (1993) suggests that scal choices appear to be interdependent not because
jurisdictions behave strategically but because they actually follow a common intellectual trendthat drives s-
cal choices in the same directions. Thus, we extend our analysis to determine whether these interdependencies
are owed to strategic interactions or only to a common trend.
14 Weights are normalised so that their sum equals unity for each i for all weight matrices. This assumes
that spatial interactions are homogeneous: each neighbour has the same impact on the commune.
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method (IV) or on maximum likelihood (ML).15
Second, the omission of explanatory variables that are spatially dependent may generate
spatial dependence in the error term, which is given by: "it = "it+vit:16 When spatial error
dependence is ignored, estimation can provide false evidence of strategic interaction. To deal
with this problem, one possible approach is to use the ML estimator, taking into account the
error structure (see Case, Rosen, and Hines, 1993) or the IV method which yields consistent
estimations even with spatial error dependence (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). Brueckner
(1998), Brueckner and Saavedra (2000), Saavedra (2000) and Foucault, Madies, and Paty
(2008) use the tests of Anselin, Bera, Florax, and Yoon (1996) to verify the hypothesis of
error independence.17
Lastly, since we introduced the lagged dependent variable as a right-hand side to consider
the autoregressive component of the time series, the previous estimators are inconsistent
(Nickell, 1981). We propose to use the GMM System estimator after verifying the hypothesis
of error independence and estimating the static model with the ML estimator. The GMM
estimators allow us to control for both unobserved country-specic e¤ects and potential
endogeneity of the explanatory variables. The GMM System estimator combines in one
system the regressions in di¤erence and the regressions in level. Basically, Blundell and Bond
(1998) show that this extended GMM estimator is preferable to that of Arellano and Bond
(1991) when the dependent variable, the independent variables, or both are persistent.18
The rst challenge of our empirical work is to determine that the observed spatial auto-
correlation can be attributed to a substantive strategic interaction process and not to exoge-
nous correlations in omitted jurisdictional characteristics or common shocks to local scal
policy. To go beyond this issue, we introduce time dummies to capture shocks in each period
15 With the IV approach, a typical procedure is to use the weighted average of neighbourscontrol variables
as instruments (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). The ML method consists in using a non-linear optimisation
routine to estimate the spatial coe¢ cient  (see Brueckner, 2003).
16 We note that the use of a panel helps to eliminate spatial error dependence which arises through spatial
autocorrelation of omitted variable, since the inuence of such variables is partly captured in community-
specic intercept terms.
17 These tests are not contaminated by uncorrected spatial error dependence and may detect the presence
of spatial lag dependence.
18 Arellano and Bond (1991) present a rst-di¤erence GMM estimator. There are, however, conceptual
and statistical shortcomings with this estimator as the rst di¤erence estimator exacerbates the bias owed to
errors in variables (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984). Thus, we use an alternative system estimator that
reduces the potential biases and imprecision associated with the usual di¤erence estimators (Arellano and
Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1998) and also greatly reduces the nite sample bias (Blundell, Bond,
and Windmeijer, 2000).
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which are common to all local governments and other specic controls. We then have
Git = :Git 1 + :Ajt + 1:Dit + 2:Ndt + i + t + "it; (11)
where Dit is the population density of jurisdiction i on year t, which captures the possibility
of scale economies in public spending,19 Ndt is the percentage of men who have a job in
département d on year t. The employment rate is an indicator of the economic conjuncture
and allows the partial control of common shocks which would be spatially correlated.
We extend our analysis to test the e¤ect of partisan a¢ liation and the scal behaviour
of local policymakers in an election period. Until he stepped down in March 2006, Mathieu
Kérékou enjoyed strong support in the north of the country (Alibori, Atacora, Borgou and
Donga) which is considered as his ef.20 When Boni Yayi was elected, he a¢ rmed his desire
for political openness. Municipal elections took place in April 2008. Parties allied with the
President won a majority of local council seats, but the most of municipalities in the south
were won by opposition parties. Departments that can be considered as efs are concentrated
in the south of the country, in particular, Atlantic, Collines and Mono. Finally, over the whole
time period, about 40% of the departments have shared the same partisan a¢ liation as the
President in o¢ ce. To capture this e¤ect (having the same partisan a¢ liation as the president
in o¢ ce), we extend our analysis by including dummy variables for political a¢ liation. We
also introduce dummy variables for election years to test opportunistic behaviour of local
policymakers.21 It follows that:
Git = :Git 1 + :Ajt + 1:Dit + 2:Ndt + 3:Oct + 4:T
+5:PRit + 6:Et 1 + 7:Et + 8:Et+1 + i + "it;
(12)
where T is a trend variable, which accounts for the common trend in local governments,
Oct is a trade openness measure at country level which controls for macroeconomic common
shocks, since developing countries are vulnerable to foreign trade.22 Moreover, it could have
19 Population density is the number of inhabitants per square kilometre. Per capita expenditures and
population density are in log. Per capita expenditures are corrected for ination.
20 Kérékou was born in 1933 in Kouarfa, in the north-west of the country.
21 We can note that we have a small number of observations for election years, so, results will only give us
an indication of the existence of opportunistic behaviour and it will be di¢ cult to come to a rm conclusion.
22 Since we introduce dummy variables for election years we can no longer introduce time dummies.
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many e¤ects on public nances.23 PRit is a dummy variable which takes the value one if
the local government i has the same political a¢ liation as the President in o¢ ce and zero
otherwise, Et 1 is a dummy variable, which takes the value one the year before the election
and zero otherwise, Et is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 the year of the election
and zero otherwise, Et+1 is a dummy variable, which takes the value one the year after the
election and zero otherwise.24
With respect to our theoretical model, we see that  6= 0 is equivalent to the existence of
some strategic interactions and that local governments are not constrained by their wealth,
on average. Moreover, if  > 0 ( < 0), that means an increase in the degree of spillover
between jurisdictions involves a variation in the same (opposite) sense of the level of local
public goods, we can conclude that local public goods are strategic complements (substitutes).
To rene this result, we will also empirically test the e¤ect of wealth constraints on the
existence of public spending interactions. Indeed, our theoretical model highlights that
strategic interactions may be restricted by the extreme poverty of some local governments. To
test the hypothesis that interactions are stronger when local governments are less constrained
by their wealth, we use an indicator of scal autonomy,25 denoted by Fit. We have:
Git = :Git 1 + :Ajt + ':AFit + 1:Dit + 2:Ndt + 3:Oct + 4:T
+5:PRit + 6:Et 1 + 7:Et + 8:Et+1 + 9:Fit + i + "it;
(13)
where AFit = Ajt Fit. If scal autonomy actually reinforces strategic interactions, we should
observe the coe¢ cient of AFit being more signicant and higher than the coe¢ cient of Ajt
(' > ). Moreover, as policymakers should interact with their neighbours only if they can
choose the level of their local resources,  may no longer be signicant. If that is the case, we
will conclude that strategic interactions are contingent on a certain degree of scal autonomy
and that strategic interactions exist only among unconstrained local governments.
23 Rodrik (1998) shows that there is a positive correlation between an economys exposure to international
trade and the size of its government because government spending plays a risk-reducing role in economies
exposed to a signicant amount of external risk.
24 Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.
25 A usual approximation of scal autonomy is the ratio of jurisdictions own resources to their total
resources.
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3.3 Results
Our dataset covers the two local elections (2002 and 2008) and the 77 communes of Benin.
Data for communes current expenditure come from Beninese Ministry of Finances and
Economy. The other control variables are drawn from WDI (World Development Indica-
tors), Afrobarometers, Demographic and Health Surveys provided by the National Institute
of Statistic and Economic Analysis of Benin and 77 monographs realised for the Mission of
Decentralisation.
First, as we have noted before, it is important to investigate whether the policy of a
local jurisdiction is actually correlated with the policies of other jurisdictions and whether
spatial lag or spatial error dependence are the more likely sources of correlation. Anselin,
Le Gallo, and Jayet (2006) have proposed two in-depth tests based on the Lagrange Mutiplier
principle for panel data that indicate the most likely source of spatial dependence (spatial lag
or spatial error dependence). We compute the same robust tests for spatial lag dependence
and for spatial error dependence which require only the OLS residuals from a non-spatial
model. Therefore, we rst estimate (12) using OLS for both contiguity and ethnic matrix
without taking into account the inuence of public spending in other jurisdictions ( = 0)
and the lagged value of our dependent variable ( = 0). The estimation results are shown
in Table 3. Spatial tests indicate the presence of spatial lag dependence for public spending
but not the existence of spatial error dependence for both matrices.
Second, since the hypothesis of error independence is veried, we estimate (12) using
ML with specic-e¤ects for both contiguity and ethnic matrices without taking into account
the lagged value of our dependent variable ( = 0), but we introduce the inuence of the
expenditure set by other jurisdictions ( 6= 0). The estimation results are shown in Table 4.
The coe¢ cient of the weighted average vector of public expenditure in the set of the other
local governments is always signicant and positive for both matrices.26
Finally, we estimate with the GMM System the dynamic model (12) for all weighting
26 In these rst estimations, departments employment rate and population density coe¢ cients are not
signicant. There are no economies of scale in the studied public spending. The trade openness indicator
coe¢ cient is signicantly positive. Dummies associated with election years indicate, a priori, an opportunistic
use of public spending during the year before the election. Indeed, current expenditure seems to increase during
the year before the election and to decrease after. Lastly, a commune governed by a local government which
has the same political a¢ liation as the president in o¢ ce has higher public expenditure.
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schemes, taking into account the lagged value of our dependent variable ( 6= 0). We adopt
the assumption of weak exogeneity of employment rates and trade openness, in the sense that
they are assumed to be uncorrelated with future realisations of error terms. The weighted
average vector of per capita public spending of other local governments is, as noted before,
suspected of endogeneity. Other explanatory variables27 are assumed to be strictly exogenous.
The lagged levels of variables are used as instruments in the regressions in level as well as in
the regressions in di¤erence. We collapse instruments and limit the number since too many
instruments lead to inaccurate estimation of the optimal weight matrix, biased standard
errors and, therefore, incorrect inference of overidentication tests (see Roodman, 2009).28
Table 5 displays estimation results.
Insert Table 5
We focus our attention on (1) (2) (3) (4) and (5), that is, the GMM System estimations
for contiguity, ethnic, uniform and placebo matrices. We can rst note that orthogonality
conditions are correct and that the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable is always
signicant and positive.29 As the coe¢ cient on lagged public spending provides an estimate
 varying between 0.411 and 0.629, the result indicates some level of persistency in public
expenditure which is likely to change slowly over time. Moreover, it conrms the consistency
of the autoregressive specication. After correction for endogeneity, the coe¢ cient of the
weighted average vector of public expenditure in the set of the other local governments is
signicant at least at 1% level and positive for ethnic and contiguity matrices.
27 Population density, time dummies, election dummies, partisan a¢ liation, trends.
28 The lags of at least two earlier periods for weak exogenous variables and three earlier periods for en-
dogenous variables are used as instruments. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented by lags of the
dependent variable from at least two earlier periods. We use two lags for endogenous and weak exogenous
variables.
29 The consistency of the estimator depends on whether lagged values of explanatory variables are valid
instruments. The criteria for the selection of instruments are two specication tests (Arellano and Bond,
1991). With the Hansen test, we test the null hypothesis of the overall validity of instrumentsorthogonality
conditions (over-identifying restrictions). The second test is about the serial correlation of residuals. It exam-
ines the hypothesis that the residuals from the rst-di¤erentiated estimating equation are not second-order
correlated. First, we test the null hypothesis of no rst-order serial correlation of di¤erentiated residuals (AR
(1) test) and second, the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation of di¤erentiated residuals (AR
(2) test). If we reject the null hypothesis of no rst-order serial correlation and do not reject the null hypoth-
esis of no second-order serial correlation of di¤erentiated residuals, the residuals are serially uncorrelated and
we conclude that orthogonality conditions are correct. In our case, both statistics conrm the validity of the
instruments used.
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At this stage, we cannot conclude that there are strategic spending interactions as Manski
(1993) suggested. If this is only a common trend that drives local governments in the same
direction, we should expect a positive sign of the interaction coe¢ cient but not a specic
pattern in the type of communes with which to interact. As the coe¢ cient of interaction with
the uniform matrix is signicant (column (3)), we can say that local governments follow, in
part, a common trend. When, however, we estimate the coe¢ cient for the contiguity matrix
after checking for common trends in column (4), the neighbouring interaction coe¢ cient
remains signicantly positive. Beyond the common trend, local governments interact with
each other. Moreover, the placebo matrix (column (5)) does not show any evidence of positive
strategic interactions. This shows that the phenomenon of scal interactions detected with
geographical and ethnical matrices is not an artefact of the estimation procedure. Note that
we have also ascertained that before 1998, the beginning of the decentralisation process,
there were no strategic interactions (see Table 6).30
Hence, we can conclude that there are strategic interactions between neighbouring juris-
dictions and that these interactions also exist between communes that are close with respect
to ethnic composition. Public expenditure seems to be a strategic complement. An aver-
age public spending increase of 10% in the neighbouring municipalities induces an increase
of around 6.2% in local primary expenditure. We nd a smaller coe¢ cient (5.1%) for the
ethnic matrix, suggesting the existence of stronger interactions among neighbouring com-
munes than among ethnically close ones. Since di¤erent ethnic groups are located in close
geographical areas, we can assume that the geographic matrix overlies the ethnic matrix. We
estimate the coe¢ cient for the ethnic matrix after checking for geographical interactions in
column (6), which remains signicant and stable. Therefore, even if geographical distance
remains more relevant for explaining interjurisdictional competition, interactions also exist
among ethnically close communes.
Finally, regarding our theoretical results, we can conclude that current expenditure is a
strategic complement, since an increase in the degree of spillover involves a variation in the
same sense in di¤erent jurisdictions. Moreover, jurisdictions seem not to be constrained by
their wealth, on average.
30 We run the same regressions as previously for the period 1994 to 1998. The coe¢ cients of interaction
with all matrices are not signicant.
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In columns (7) and (8), we test the robustness of these results by estimating the same
econometric model with alternative matrices. The neigh2 matrix, in which the value of one
is assigned if two communes belong to the same département and zero otherwise, is a proxy
of the contiguity matrix. Indeed, two communes that belong to the same département are
generally close. The ethn2 matrix is dened as follows: the value one is assigned if two
communes have the same dominant ethnic group and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cient of
the weighted average vector of public expenditure in the set of the other local governments
remains positive and signicant at the 5% level for the neigh2 matrix but only at 10% for
the ethnic matrix ethn2. Additionally, these estimations tend to conrm the existence of
opportunistic behaviour of local governments and the e¤ects of partisan a¢ liation.
We nd a positive and signicant sign for the parameter associated with the employment
rate, which indicates the e¤ect of economic conjuncture. The trend variable remains, as
expected, signicant and negative. Indeed, per capita public expenditure has decreased
by 75% over the period despite little growth between 2004 and 2006. There seems to be
opportunistic behaviour of local jurisdictions since dummies associated with the pre-election
year indicate an increase in public spending.31 Thus, we nd some evidence of a political
budget cycle for current expenditure in this young democracy.32 As we noted before, however,
it is relatively di¢ cult to determine since we have a small number of observations. In addition,
it appears that having a local government which has the same political a¢ liation as the
President in o¢ ce is likely to increase public expenditure. Indeed, the coe¢ cient of the
dummy variable that indicates whether the local government has the same political a¢ liation
as the President in o¢ ce is always signicant.33
In columns (9) and (10), we test the e¤ect of wealth constraints on the existence of pub-
lic spending interactions by estimating equation (13) for both matrices. As expected, the
31 To understand the sign of the coe¢ cient associated with the election year dummy, one must refer to the
election calendar and budget votes. Local elections took place at the beginning of March and the denitive
budget must be adopted before 31 March. Therefore, in the year before the elections, decision-makers increase
current expenditures and decrease them the year after, since the denitive budget is approved.
32 Shi and Svensson (2006) have shown that political budget cycles are much larger in young democracies
than in developed countries, particularly in countries with weak institutional constraints on incumbents
rent-seeking ability.
33 These municipalities benet from higher state subsidies.
Note that the parameter associated with population density is positive but not always signicant. This
is also the case for the coe¢ cient of trade openness, which is negative but not always signicant. As some
of these e¤ects o¤set each other, it is often di¢ cult to predict the net e¤ect of trade openness on public
expenditure which is not signicant.
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coe¢ cient of the interaction variable between the neighbours spending decisions and the
indicator of scal autonomy (') is positive and signicant. We can thus conclude that inter-
actions are stronger when local governments have a more signicant share of their own local
resources. Furthermore, since the coe¢ cient for strategic interaction alone () is no longer
signicant, strategic interactions are contingent on scal autonomy: strategic interactions
exist only among local governments which have a certain degree of autonomy.
At this stage, our results suggest that decentralisation has induced interjurisdictional
competition. Indeed, there are strategic interactions between Beninese local governments
with regard to current expenditure that appears to be strategic complement. These inter-
dependences exist between neighbouring communes but also between those which are close
in terms of ethnic composition. Finally, we have found a variation of public expenditure
in the same sense between close local jurisdictions: local public goods are strategic comple-
ments and, on average, local jurisdictions are not constrained by their wealth. Moreover, our
results conrm that strategic interactions are contingent on scal autonomy. Estimations
tend to show that local governments adopt opportunistic behaviour before elections. Lastly,
communes where local government has the same political a¢ liation as the President enjoy
higher public spending.
3.4 What happens in electoral years?
This section is really an empirical extension of our theoretical model, in which perfect infor-
mation is assumed. Electoral years implicitly refer to a yardstick competition model, which is
based on the informational asymmetry among local elected decision-makers and jurisdictions
populations. Indeed, in this model, voters can use the performance cues of other governments
as a benchmark to judge whether their representative wastes resources and deserves to re-
main in o¢ ce. During an electoral year, we may expect that political campaigns increase
interactions among communes, since more information is available on the scal policies of
local decision-makers, reinforcing the e¤ect of yardstick competition.
Here, we evaluate the e¤ects of electoral pressure on inter-jurisdictional interactions. The
challenge consists in evaluating the real electoral pressure induced by decentralisation by
identifying the e¤ect of elections on interjurisdictional competition. We consider the election
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cycle variables to test the hypothesis that interactions may be stronger in election periods.
A straightforward way to test this is to interact the neighbours spending decisions (Ajt)
with the election years dummy, EY (Et 1 and Et) and estimate two di¤erent interaction
coe¢ cients, one for years of election (Ajt  EY ) and one for all the other periods, NEY
(= 1  EY ), (Ajt NEY ).
Git = Sit 1 + 0:(Ajt  EY ) + 00:(Ajt NEY ) + 1:Dit + 2:Ndt
+3:Oct + 4:T + 5:PRit + 6:EY + 7:NEY + i + "it;
(14)
where EY = Et 1 + Et and NEY = (1   (Et 1 + Et)). If elections actually reinforce
the exposure of jurisdictions, we should observe the coe¢ cient of (Ajt  EY ) being more
signicant and higher than the coe¢ cient (AjtNEY ) as policymakers should be particularly
concerned about their neighboursdecisions during election periods.
Insert Table 7
We note that signicant coe¢ cients have the same sign as in previous estimations and that
statistics conrm the validity of used instruments. Therefore, we focus our analysis on the
comparison of the interaction term coe¢ cients. As expected, the coe¢ cient is slightly higher
and more signicant in election periods than in other periods with contiguity and ethnic
matrices. Therefore, current expenditure settings appear to be a little more dependent on
neighbours during election periods. We complete our analysis with Wald tests to test how
coe¢ cients during election periods are signicantly di¤erent from those in other periods.
These tests do not indicate that the election year interaction coe¢ cients are signicantly
di¤erent at the 10% level from the non-election ones. Thus, it is not a denite fact that
yardstick competition is the main channel of communesinteractions.
4 Conclusion
Decentralisation has been advocated to improve the performance of the public sector by
stimulating interjurisdictional competition. The originality of our paper consists in reason-
ing from an African case in which decentralisation has been recently implemented. One may
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expect that scal interactions in a developing country where local public resources are scarce
would remain modest. Our paper shows that this is not the case. Indeed, for the rst time,
we provide a new contribution in the scal federalism literature by ascertaining that decen-
tralisation entails interjurisdictional interactions in an African country. These interactions
are not a common trend. They exist not only among neighbouring local jurisdictions but also
among communes which are close in terms of ethnic composition. We also emphasise both
the inuence of partisan a¢ liation and the opportunistic behaviour of local governments
before elections. Finally, Benin which has recently experienced a decentralisation process
seems to be as concerned with scal strategic interactions as developed democracies.
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A Appendix
A.1 Figure and Tables
Figure 1: Administrative map of Benin
27
Table 1: Estimation results for the presence of scale economies - Specic e¤ects
Dependent variable: current expenditure of communei (Gi;t)
Population density 2.540** (1.41)
Squared Population density 0.001*** (0.00)
Haussman test: p-value 0.34
Observations 429
Robust standard errors are in brackets.***: co e¢ cient sign icant at 1 % level, **: at 5 % level, * : at 10 % level.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Current expenditure 448 2915 10934 15.06
(Basilla)
123779
(Cotonou)
Population density 378 334.94 1019.25 7.61
(Tangui.)
7684
(Cotonou)
Employment rate 462 26.67 10.68 3.46
(Kandi)
59.40
(Cotonou)
Trade openess 462 39.14 0.81 37.95
(2003)
40.20
(2008)
Partisan a¢ liation 462 0.38 0.48 0 1
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